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ABSTRACT
The recall of an event such as a
robbery has been shown to be affected by
how closely post-event information
corresponds to what the witness actually
saw. The purpose of this study was to
investigate how the effect of misleading
information may be influenced by expertise
of the source of the post-event information.
Results revealed that subjects recalled less
accurately when they received misleading
information in the narrative than when the
information corresponded with what they
had viewed, whereas the accuracy of the
recall was unaffected by whether the
witness in the narrative was an expert or a
non-expert. Subjects rated the narrative
witnesses as having equal credibility. This
study suggests that the memory for events
related to a crime-scene may be impaired by
misleading post-event information, but is
unaffected by the source of that misleading
information when the sources differ in
occupational expertise.
INTRODUCTION
A significant body of literature has
shown that misleading post-event
information impairs memory for the original
event (Loftus, 1979; Loftus & Loftus,
1980). Many of these studies involved
subjects looking at a slide presentation of an
event, reading misleading post event
information, and answering a questionnaire
measuring recall accuracy. The results
consistently indicated that misinformation
did affect recall accuracy (Lindsay, 1990;
Loftus, Miller, & Bums, 1978: McCloskey
& Zaragoza, 1985; Tousignant, Hall &
Loftus, 1986; Tversky & Tuchin, 1989;
Zaragoza, McCloskey & Jamis, 1987;

Zaragoza & Koshmider, 1989).
Furthermore, eyewitnesses exposed
to misleading information on some aspect
of a previously witnessed event are likely to
report the misleading information with
confidence (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985;
Zaragoza, McCloskey & Jamis, 1987;
Tversky & Tuchin, 1989). However, a
significant line of research (Bekerian &
Bowers, 1983) suggests that the
malleability of eyewitness memory is
largely due to a mismatch of encoding retrieval cues . Bekerian & Bowers
proposed that the typical paradigm used to
study eyewitness memory (slide
presentations, questionnaire containing
misleading questions, recognition* memory
tests would bias subjects towards forgetting
the critical details since the thematic context
in which subjects recalled did not match
their encoding context. When order was
preserved at recall these authors found no
effect of misleading information (Tulving &
Thomson, 1973). Zaragoza and Koshmider
(1989) found that exposure to misleading
information did not lead subjects to believe
that they remembered seeing the
misinformation nor did it reduce subjects'
ability to accurately identify the source of
the originally seen details. The results of
this study do not support the hypothesis
that misleading information impairs
memory of the originally seen event and
suggests that subjects may report
misinformation from the narrative even if
they know they did not see it.
Lindsay (1990) supported the
hypothesis that misleading suggestions can
impair recollection. This result was
consistent with Loftus's original
hypothesis. Lindsay's study however was
different from the other studies in that this
study used the design based on the "logic of
opposition", and the study consisted of
informing the experimental subjects that
they were going to be deceived in the
questionnaire. It is quite possible that the
suggestion alone might have caused the
subjects to be overly cautious in reading the
narrative and answering the recall
questionnaire which in turn might have
affected the results.
Previous research studies on
eyewitness testimony have focused on the
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effects of misinformation on the accuracy of
recall. However, there has not been a study
that has studied the effects of correct
information on accuracy recall. All of the
previous studies had used misinformation
for the experimental condition and for the
control condition used "neutral" information
that was neither consistent nor inconsistent
with the correct information. Correct
information would increase recall accuracy;
for example, in realistic cases where
eyewitnesses are not sure of the details,
correct information might cue memory and
enhance recall accuracy. In the present
study one we investigated the effects of
incorrect information compared to correct
information on recall accuracy.
The studies done on eyewitness
testimony have great implications in the
areas of social psychology and law. In
court cases involving eyewitness testimony
it is important for the witness to be able to
testify to accurate information. Eyewitness
testimony is commonly accepted as being
the truth by juries; however, in light of
recent studies on the subject of eyewitness
accuracy, the results are convincing that
recall might not always be accurate. In the
judicial setting, it is common to see lawyers
use "misleading suggestions" to get the
witness to answer in a way that provides
evidence for their case (Smith, 1989);
therefore, it is important to know whether
or not witnesses can be persuaded to report
incorrect information.
In addition, politicians, lawyers,
and other professionals have utilized their
credibility to improve acceptance of their
messages. A study by Chebat, Filiatrault
and Perrien (1990) investigated the effect of
credibility on message acceptance, where
credibility had two component, cognitive
and affective. The cognitive component was
trustworthiness and expertness, and the
affective component consisted of
attractiveness and prestige. The subjects
answered a questionnaire on credibility of
the source and message acceptance. The
results of their study indicated that
credibility has an impact on message
acceptance where the more credible source
had the greater message acceptance by the
subjects.

Credibility may also be
operationally defined in terms of
experience. A study done by Okamoto &
Sugahara (1986) defined a credible source
as someone who watched the film 5 times
and the non- credible source as someone
who watched the film only 1 time. The
study consisted of subjects viewing a film
and reading narrative about the film and
answering questions testing recall accuracy.
The results of this study indicated that postevent information affected recall; however,
perceived credibility did not effect recall. In
the present study we investigated the
influence of a different operational
definition of expertise: the influence of
occupational expertise(expert(policeman)
versus non-expert(salesman)) on acceptance
of misinformation and/or correct
information.
To summarize, when subjects
witness an event and are .exposed to
misinformation about the event, past
research suggests that the subjects would
report the misinformation with confidence
(Lindsay, 1990; Loftus, Miller & Burns,
1978; Zaragoza & Koshmider, 1989).
Whether these findings reflect a rewrite of
the original memory or a retrieval
interference is not yet known. We propose
that if subjects are more easily misled by an
expert source than a non-expert, then there
is some source monitoring error occurring
of either encoding or retrieval. Source
monitoring error refers to the inability of the
subject to discriminate between information
obtained from the original event and
information obtained from the post-event
narrative. Source monitoring error would
suggest something other than passive
rewrite system. When subjects are given
statements by an expert as opposed to a
non-expert source, the research data
suggests that the subjects are more likely to
accept information from the expert source
(Chebat, et. al., 1990). In the present study
we investigate two hypotheses: subjects are
more likely to be misled by incorrect
information than correct information, and
subjects will be more likely to report the
information that comes from the expert than
the non expert source.
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METHOD
Subjects
Forty-five graduate and
undergraduate students (13 males and 32
females) from Loyola Marymount
University volunteered for this experiment.
Approximately one-half of the subjects
received extra credit in their psychology
courses for their participation in the
experiment.
Materials
The stimulus materials consisted of
slides, three of which were critical,
depicting a theft scene. All slides were
presented on an slide projector carousel
onto a white screen. The distance of the
projector from the screen was 14 feet and 6
inches. The visual image from the slide
projector was projected 4 feet from the
floor. The slide sequence depicted a sunny
summer day at an outdoor mall. The slides
began with two filler slides of the outdoor
mall. Next, a female dressed in a blue dress
was shown carrying two bags, while a male
in a white shirt and gray shorts followed
her. The male was shown taking one of the
bags from where the female placed them.
The last two slides in the slide sequence
were filler slides of the outdoor mall.
All subjects were randomly
assigned to one of five groups:
Correct!
Expert, Correct/ Non-Expert, Misled/
Expert, Misled/ Non-expert, and unrelated
narrative.
Our expert source was identified as
a police officer, and the non-expert as a
salesman. We based the credibility on the
occupational title alone. The post event
narratives contained six critical items from
three of the critical slides presented to the
subjects. Three of the items were from the
foreground, and three from the
background. In the narrative containing
correct information, the six critical items
were congruent with the slide sequence.
The six critical items in the misleading
narrative were manipulated. The unrelated
narrative consisted of a text of the same
length as the experimental texts which was
about women in the civil war.

All instructions were presented via a
cassette player. The subjects were seated
between 8'4" - 13'9" from the tape
recorder. The tape recorder was placed on a
desk which stood approximately 3' tall.
At the completion of the narrative,
all subjects were asked to answer a 12-item
true/false recognition test on the event
depicted in the slide presentation, along
with a confidence rating of their answers to
each question. An overall credibility rating
of the source of the narrative was also used.
A measurement of credibility was required
to test the effect of a credible source on the
acceptance of post-event information,
correct or misleading, over the subjects
memory of the actual event.
Procedure
Independent variables were (a)
credibility of the source of the post-event
narrative (policeman/ expert vs. salesman/
non-expert) and (b) the type of information
presented in the post-event narrative
(correct vs. misleading). The dependent
variables were measured by analyzing the
subjects recall of critical items from
foreground, background, and total critical
items. The second dependent variable
measured was the confidence rating
subjects gave themselves on their
recollection of the event.
Subjects were informed, via an
audio tape, that the experiment would test
memory and recall pertaining to visual
stimulus. They were told that they should
pay careful attention to the slide
presentation. Each slide was displayed on a
white screen for 12 seconds. Following the
visual presentation, the subjects were given
a booklet containing the written materials.
First, the subjects were told to turn to the
first page and begin the filler task. The filler
task was a word search puzzle which the
subjects had to complete in five minutes.
After the five minutes was completed, the
tape player was turned on. Subjects were
then instructed to turn to the narrative which
depicted the events in the visual
presentation (either true or false) or trivial
information (the control). Subjects had two
minutes to read the narrative. The
instructions explicitly informed the subjects
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that they were not to reread the material. At
the completion of two minutes, subjects
were instructed to turn to the questionnaire
portion of the booklet. Next, subjects
received a true/false recognition test
accompanied by the 5-point confidence
scale. Each subject was instructed to
respond to each item based on their recall
and rate their confidence in their responses
on a Likert scale, from 1 through 5.
Subjects were instructed not to change their
answers. The last item of the test asked
which subjects to rate their narrative's
depiction of the event (with a credibility
rating of 1 not at all credible to 5 extremely
credible). After the true/false test,
confidence rating, and narrator's credibility
rating, subjects were asked to complete a
demographic questionnaire. When everyone
had finished, the booklets were collected
and the subjects were debriefed as to the
nature of the experiment.
RESULTS

questions pertaining to the foreground
information the control group (M=2.20)
scored slightly but not significantly higher
than the group receiving misleading
information. On the background measure
the control group (M=1.80) scored slightly
but not significantly higher than the
misleading information group.
Confidence
There were no significant main
effects of confidence on source or
information type in the results. There was a
significant interaction between the two
variables, F(1,31)= 4.088, a<.0 5.
However, planned independent t-tests did
not reveal any significant differences
between the means.
Credibility
No significant main or interaction
effects were observed for credibility or
information type.
DISCUSSION

Recall
The results of a 2X2 betweensubjects ANOVA (excluding the unrelated
narrative group) revealed that there were no
significant main effects of source or
interaction effects on the recall measures:
foreground items, background items and
combined items. Thus the analysis was
collapsed across source and analyzed with a
one-way ANOVA (misinformation, correct
information, and neutral information).
There was a significant main effect of the
information type on the recall measures. On
the foreground measure (F(1,31)=6.704,
p_<0.05), subjects given misleading
information scored lower than subjects
given correct information (M=1.650 vs.
M=2.536). on the background measure
(F(1,31)=4.931, n<0.05), subjects given
misleading information scored lower that
subjects given correct information
(M=1.350 vs. M=2.134). Lastly, on the
combined measure, subjects given
misleading information scored lower that
subjects using correct information (M=3.00
vs. M=4.527).
Post-hoc t-tests comparing the four
groups to the control group revealed that on

In this study we investigated
whether subjects are likely to be misled by
misinformation when this information is
given in a narrative form compared to
reinforcement through repetition in the same
narrative format. As expected, subjects
given misleading information in a postevent narrative obtained lower recall scores
than those subjects who received correct
information. These results are consistent
with previous findings by Lindsay (1990),
Tousignant, Hall, and Loftus (1986), and
Zaragoza, Jamis, and McClosky (1987). In
each of these studies results indicated that
misleading suggestions can interfere with a
subject's ability to recollect event details.
This phenomenon has been referred to as
the "misinformation effect" (Tousignant,
Hall, and Loftus, 1986).
Several reasons for this memory
impairment have been suggested: (1)
demand characteristics, (2) higher rate of
correct guessing; and (3) differential
response criteria for report of event details
on control and misled items (Lindsay,
1990) and overwriting of the original
memory (Loftus, Miller & Burns, 1978).
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Although the ongoing debate among
cognitive psychologists regarding what
actually happens to the original information
is still unsettled, our results and previous
studies continue to indicate that misleading
post-event information does indeed affect a
subject's ability to recall the original
information.
The lack of significant findings for
the source variable suggests that subjects
may not have had this information available
to them at retrieval time. This may have
occurred because subjects were insensitive
to source at encoding or that, at retrieval,
subjects did not distinguish between the
original memory and the narrative source.
This apparently occurred regardless of
whether the narrative information was
misleading or correct, or from an expert or
non-expert. Expertise in this study was
assigned, after Bregman and McAllister
(1982), according to competence (i.e.
personal knowledge of and understanding
about the material). The lack of any
differences in credibility ratings may have
been due to our operational definition of
credibility. Occupational title alone may
provide insufficient information to subjects
for them to make an accurate judgment of
credibility. It may also have provided the
subjects with inadequate data for them to
distinguish, at encoding or retrieval,
between the original memory, or the
narrative information. Another reason for
this result may have been sociological in
that the study was conducted in Los
Angeles near the site of the Rodney King
police brutality incident within four months
of the incident. Police credibility may have
been undermined in our sample by this
incident.
If subjects were unable to
discriminate one source of information from
another at recall, then their confidence
levels would be expected to be similar for
these retrievals. We found that subjects had
similar confidence levels regardless of
whether they had read the misleading,
correct or neutral narrative, and whether
there narratives were from an expert or nonexpert source. These findings may be
attributed to source monitoring errors.
Source monitoring error refers to the
inability of the subject to discriminate

between information obtained from the
original event (source #1) and information
obtained from the post-event narrative
(source #2). Because of the lack of ability
to discriminate, a person is likely to recall
incorrect information from the second
source or post-event narrative, believe it as
being correct and rate himself as being
confident in his recall of incorrect
information. This hypothesis has been
supported by other researchers (Cole &
Loftus, 1979; Greene, Flynne Loftus,
1982).
In studies of eyewitness testimony,
internal validity versus external or
ecological validity is a big issue. The
question that arises, is how can the results
from an experiment executed under very
controlled circumstances be applied to
general society?
This study was conducted using a
realistic slide presentation to simulate an
actual crime scene and realistic source. The
goal was to simulate a less controlled
environment, and increase ecological
validity.
The applications of this study and
others like it are many, such studies touch
on areas ranging from the proceedings
carried out in the court room to research
being carried out in areas of psychology
such as social or cognitive psychology. In
terms of court proceedings, research can
affect how witnesses are handled during
questioning so their recall can be guaranteed
to be as unaffected as possible by postevent information in the form of reports,
and repeated questioning by various
sources ranging from police investigators to
attorneys.
REFERENCES
Bell, B.E., & Loftus, E.F. (1988). Degree
of detail of eyewitness testimony
and mock juror judgments. Journal
of Applied Psychology, 18, 11711192.
Bekerian, D.A. & Bowers, J.M. (1983).
Eyewitness testimony: Were we
misled?. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory and
Cognition, 9, 1, 139-145.

MODERN PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES

18

THE INTERACTION OF SOURCE AND MISINFORMATION

Bregman, N. J. & McAllister, H. A.
(1982). Eyewitness testimony: the
role of commitment in increasing
reliability. Social Psychology
Quarterly, 45, 181-184.
Chebat, J., Filiatrault, P., & Perrien, J.
(1989). Limits of credibility: The
case of political persuasion. Journal
of Social Psychology, 130, 157167.
Cole, W.G., & Loftus,E.F. (1979).
Incorporating new information into
memory. American Journal of
Psychology, 3, 413-425.
Greene, E., Flynn, M.S., & Loftus, E.F.
(1982). Inducing resistance to
misleading information. Journal of
Verbal Learning and Verbal
Behavior, 21, 207-219.
Lindsay, D.S. (1990). Misleading
suggestions can impair
eyewitnesses' ability to remember
event details. Journal of
Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory and Cognition,
16, 1077-1083.
Loftus, E.F. (1979). Eyewitness
Testimony. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Loftus, E.F., & Loftus, G. (1980). On the
permanence of stored information in
the human brain. American
Psychologist, 35, 409-420.
Loftus, E.F., Miller, D.G., & Burns, H.J.
(1978). Semantic integration of
verbal information into visual
memory. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Learning and
Memory, 4, 19-31.
McCloskey, M., & Zaragoza, M. (1985).
Misleading post event information
and memory for events. Argument
and evidence against memory i
mpairment hypothesis. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General,
114, 1-16.
Okamoto, S. & Sugahara, Y. (1986).
Effects of post-event information on
eyewitness testimony. Japanese
Psychological Research, 28, 196201.
Schooler, J.W., Gerhard, D., & Loftus,
E.F. (1986). Qualities of the unreal.

Journal of Experimental
Psychology; General ,12, 171-181.
Schum, D.A. (1989). Knowledge,
probability, and credibility. Journal
of Behavioral Decision Making,
2, 39-62.
Smith, S.R. (1989). Mental health expert
witnesses: Of science and crystal
balls. Behavioral Sciences and the
Law, 7, 145-180.
Tousignant, J.P., Hall, D., & Loftus, E.F.
(1986).Discrepancy detection and
vulnerability to misleading post
event information. Memory and
Cognition, 14, 329-338.
Tulving, E., & Thompson, D.M. (1973).
Encoding specificity and retrieval
processes in episodic memory.
Psychological Review, 80, 352373.
Tversky, B., & Tuchin, M. (1989). A r
econciliation of the evidence on
eyewitness testimony: Comments
on McCloskey and Zaragoza
(1985). Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 118, 86-91.
Zaragoza, M.S., & Koshmider, J.W.
(1989). Misled subjects may know
more than their performance i
mplies. Journal Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition, 15, 246-255.
Zaragoza, M.S., McCloskey, M., & Jamis,
M. (1987).Misleading post event
Further evidence against the
memory. Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 13, 36-44.
Notes : The authors would like tho thank Bill
Hoffman for his help during data collection for this
study.

MODERN PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES

19

